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A
PLATO'S THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
IN REPUBLIC II-IV
"Actions speak louder than words."
(Old saying)
After his long construction of a "city in speech" throughout Books II-IV 
of the Republic, Plato finally presents, as his long sought-for definition of 
social justice, the enigmatic and ambiguous formula, "each one doing his own."
My main aim in this paper will be to search out the sense that he has esta­
blished for that definition: to show how he thinks he has established (by the 
time he unveils it) that that unlikely formula is in fact a reasonable defini­
tion of social justice, and to analyze what it means (Sections I-III). Once we 
are clear about that, I believe, it will also be clear that Plato's theory of 
justice has its primary sources in sophistic thinking, and, in particular, in 
the contractarian approach to political philosophy. The very suggestion may 
well seem bizarre, since Socrates' entire construction is given as a massive 
reply precisely to Glaucon's contractarian story early in Republic II, but I 
shall argue that Plato's theory is an extended development of and from Sophis­
tic contractarian social theory - not a sheer repudiation of it nor an auto­
nomous alternative to it (Section IV). One fringe benefit of this reading will 
be that it lets us make very clear the force of Plato's distinction between 
justice and temperance - a distinction that many interpreters have not been 
able to salvage at all, let alone to make clear (Section V).
Before embarking, I must emphasize the restricted nature of my theme.
Much of Plato's theory in Books II-IV was, doubtless, aimed at preparing the 
way for, or at making contact with, his subsequent, internalized theory of 
personal justice as psychic harmony - the theory that then bears the burden of 
his argument that "justice pays." (In Plato's own metaphor, the study of the 
"large letters" is undertaken for the sake of getting at the "small letters.")
True as this is, we cannot explain Books II-IV merely by the end result they 
aim at achieving. Plato's project in the Republic is rather like someone tun­
neling through a mountain by drilling in from both sides at once toward a 
meeting place somewhere in the middle: each side does have to know where the 
other side is headed, but each must also proceed on its own terms. The theory 
of social justice developed in Books II-IV must make sense as a theory of
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social justice - one that might stand alone even if it were not to be pro­
jected subsequently onto the "smaller letters." I shall try to show reason to 
believe (from the claims Plato makes in the "discovery passage" and especially 
from the discrepancy between the discovering of justice and the discovering of 
the other virtues there) that Plato thought his definition of justice had its 
ground in the role that it had played throughout the entire construction 
undertaken in Republic II-IV. At any rate, my present concern is solely with 
the side of Plato's "drilling operation" that sets out his theory of social 
justice? its relevance to his theory of psychic justice lies outside the 
present paper's limits.
I
Our argument begins where Plato ends, with his "discovery" of the defini­
tion for justice at Rep. 427-434. The imagery of that familiar passage is 
wonderfully vivid and concrete. Plato urges us to peer at his completed model 
city and to search out the site of all the virtues in it? much as if it were 
one of those puzzle pictures where we try to find the faces hidden in the 
branches of the bushes, we are enjoined to "look" and to try to "find" or 
"see" just "where," where "in it," each of the virtues that we seek is seated 
or "resides." The imagery is a most effective expository device - but of 
course cannot justify the content of the definitions it is used to bring 
forth. (Neither, it seems to me, does Plato claim any such demonstrative 
cogency for it; his "method of residues" or the argument by elimination belong 
to his machinery for discovering - i.e. uncovering or disclosing - his views, 
and not to the grounds for their justification.) For our present purposes, 
however, the important fact about Plato's method for disclosing his defini­
tions of the virtues is the way in which it breaks down in the key case of 
justice. Each of the other three virtues is discovered to reside somewhere 
"in" the completed city. Each turns out to "reside" there in importantly dif­
ferent ways - some in a specific "part" of the city (428E, 429B, 431E) and 
temperance diffused throughout the whole (432A) - but the method works for all 
three: all are features of the city that prove "visible" somewhere in its fin­
ished form. But not so justice. To be sure, when Plato comes to the case of 
justice he continues and even intensifies his metaphor of searching and peer­
ing, his urgings to look sharply and not let the prey escape (432B7-C6) and 
his mock-somber words about the shadowed darkness of its lurking place (C7-9). 
Yet none of this can mask the fact that he does not, in the end, find justice
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to be visible, like the others, in the finished city. Instead, as he abruptly 
comes to "realize," it is not at all to be found on the same terms as they 
were: it is not something visible only in the finally completed city, but has 
been right before them all along, all through the process of constructing the 
city, "right from the beginning" (432D7, 433A1). %  fundamental thesis will be
that this discrepancy between the "finding" of justice and the finding of the 
other political virtues is the key to the Republic's doctrine of political 
justice. We shall return in due course to an attempt to explain what lies 
behind this "discrepancy" (in Section IV below), but first we need to look at 
some details of Plato's exposition in Books II-IV.
When Plato does at last unveil his definition of justice, he gives us the 
following:
What we laid down at the start as a general requirement when we were 
founding the polis, this, or some form of it, is justice. For we 
did lay down, and often stated, if you recall, that every single 
individual ought to engage in that single social function for which 
his own nature is best suited. (433A1-6)
The principle of justice stated here, in these unlikely terms, in fact 
involves several distinguishable components, and all have indeed been 
emphasized throughout Plato's earlier account of the city (though, as we shall 
see, the commentators tend to notice only a portion of its complex content).
We shall have to distinguish some further aspects of this principle of justice 
(see Section III below) but for the present we need mention only three. These 
I shall dub (A) the Uniqueness Requirement: that each man should do one and 
only one job; (B) the Fittedness Requirement: that that job should be the one 
for which each is best naturally suited; and (C) the Service Requirement: that 
each individual should contribute through his job to the common good of the 
society as a whole. Most commentators see a reference to the first two in 433A 
(citing such passages as 370A-C» 395B-C and 397E), but the third one, too, is 
essential, even if, like so much else in Plato's treatment of justice, it is 
perhaps so obvious as to escape attention. It is indicated in the very text 
of 433A by Plato's reference to the "one job" in question for each man as his 
hen...ton peri ten polin: his "one social service in the state" (Shorey), "one 
function in the community" (Cornford), or the like. Although it has perhaps 
not "oftentimes" been referred to earlier, this general principle of service 
to the polis has indeed been a guiding principle throughout the construction.
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It was made forcefully explicit on at least one important occasion, and a 
close look at an unnoticed detail of that occasion will help shed light upon 
the principles of justice that have in fact been "right before our eyes from 
the start." The passage I have in mind is Socrates' well-known reply (at 
420B-421C) when Adeimantus complains that no particularly "happy" lot has been 
contrived for the Guardians of the polis. The basic aim of any polis, Socrates 
answers, is not the happiness or good of any part within it, but the common 
good of the whole. His account of that principle need not concern us now. 
Instead it is important to observe the way that Socrates refers to the princi­
ple when raising it in his reply: confronted with Adeimantus' "charges" and 
asked how he will "defend" himself (420B1; cf. 419A2), he answers that "by 
following the same path we shall, I think, find what must be said." But by 
what right does he refer to it as "the same path"? Although some commentators 
have remarked on the poetic word that Plato uses here for "path," I know of 
none who have dealt with his reference to the path in question as "the same." 
Yet it must be the "same" one, obviously enough, as they have been following 
up to that point - following right from the start. Thus they must all along 
(so Socrates' remark implies) have been designing a city in which each 
member's functioning subserves the good of all the others and (thereby) serves 
the common good of the whole. As far as I have been able to find, this princi­
ple of contribution to a common good for the whole city has not in fact been 
stated „explicitly before 420-421. (It is given subsequently, at 466A, and, 
most importantly and adequately, at 519E-520A, when Plato argues that his 
philosopher-king should return to the cave to rule - but not before 420-421.) 
Nonetheless, it can fairly easily be seen to have been one of Plato's basic 
constructive principles "from the very start." For what already constitutes 
his "minimal city" of 3698-D as in fact a "city" is the awareness, on the part 
of each and every one of its members (all four or five of them!), that they 
are associated with one another in it - each one "calling upon" or "making use 
of" each other member's roles or skills (369C1-2) - for their mutual advan­
tage: in that "minimal city,"
each one gives over to each other one (if he does give over anything 
at all) or takes over from each other one, because each supposes 
that to do so is better for himself. (369C6-7)
Plato's fundamental point here at the very start of his construction is that 
each and every member's needs must be advanced by the working together of the
c 5*
"congregation" (synoikia). What makes their elementary city a "city" Is not 
the mere diversity of the labor collected In It, but rather their sharing of 
that labor In the shared awareness that so doing Is a means to every member's 
satisfying his, and every other member's, fundamental needs. It is not as 
though one needed, in order to constitute a city, merely to have different 
forms of skill and labor gathered together in it - as though what made it a 
"city" were the mere presence in it of a variety of functions. What is essen­
tial to the city, and indeed constitutive of it, is rather the reciprocal 
inter-relatedness of these diverse functions. The "minimal city" of 369B-D is 
simply one in which this shared reciprocation is extremely obvious. At the 
same time, just because it is so very small and simple a city cr í?o1it¡cal 
whole, it is perhaps at the same time not so obvious that th*s reciprocity, as 
a means of achieving a common good for all concerned, is in fact operating as 
a "constitutive principle" of its wholeness. (The unaided eye can take in 
groups of four or five as wholes of some kind at a single glance!) Only as the 
city becomes larger and more complex does this principle emerge into explicit­
ness as a controlling factor in its design and operation. That is what happens 
at 420B. Socrates is perfectly justified, however, in speaking of the princi­
ple that he enunciates there as the "same path" he has been following all 
along, for it has been, even if only implicitly, a controlling factor of his 
construction "from the very beginning." By the same token, Plato is quite jus­
tified when he claims later on (in the discovery passage at 432D-433A) that 
the "service requirement" which we found incorporated in his definition of 
political justice has been in front of the reader "all along - from the very 
beginning" - even if it has until then "escaped them" (433 E2-3) that it was 
there all along and was indeed functioning as part of the principle of jus­
tice.
We shall soon see how scrupulously Plato follows out that principle or 
"path" in his evolving construction of the city. It seems well to pause first 
to emphasize two implications of Plato's little-noticed reference (at 420B2) 
to the path in question as "the same one." For one, the reference should make 
it clear - lest any reader be taken in by Socrates' "surprise" about the sud­
den "turning up" of justice at 432B-E (as if the old man had actually simply 
let his city "grow" and were peering at the final product, puzzled and yet 
hopeful, wondering where within it justice might possibly be) - that his 
entire account of the basic structure of the city was deliberately governed
6from the start by definite, although implicit, requirements - the very ones 
that are to be "discovered" later as the content of justice. Second - and even 
more important - it should make it clear that those requirements are not con­
fined to his principle of one man-one job (and that one job "his own") but 
also include the mutual adjustment of these jobs to one another to bring about 
a shared resultant good. That is, in terms of our earlier itemization of the 
elements of his definition of justice, his principle of justice requires not 
only (A) and (B) but also (C). Indeed, this last requirement is essential to 
reading the Republic as an account of social or political justice at all.
Taken alone, the first two principles might conceivably be read as endorsing 
some radically (even if ridiculously) apolitical or antipolitical program of 
private personal self-fulfillment. On an adequately narrow view of each one 
"doing his own," it might look like an invitation to an anarchic dispersal of 
individual life careers, with everyone "doing his own t h i n g . W e  would then 
have individuals setting off in separate search of fulfillment - restricted, 
let us grant, by the requirement that they not encroach, in seeking their own, 
on anybody else's seeking Jns own, but still omitting the requirement that is, 
on Plato's account, absolutely central to the political character of the 
quest: that the search be made in concert with others, in and through the 
institutions of the polis. That requirement is made explicit in the statement 
of the principle of justice at 433A5-6; for as that statement makes clear, the 
one thing of each man's "own" that justice stipulates that he "do" is his one
T. The very formula that Plato uses for his definition of justice 
can refer to totally apolitical behavior. Thus at " . 370A4 it
means seeing to one's own needs all by oneself and ther giving 
help to others nor accepting it from them (see also note 4 below 
on this passage). Again, at 496D6 (the philosopher crouching 
behind a wall so as to keep a low profile) it means tending to 
one's own affairs and ignoring everybody else's (06 ta hautou 
pratton there contrasting with C8 ta ton poleon prattei). These 
"isolationist" passages thus prove equivalent to each person's 
"doing whatever he pleases," in contrast to serving the polis (cf. 
520A3-4 and context). In all these cases, to be sure, context pro­
vides essential help in bringing out the asocial, anti-political 
reading of Plato's phrase. Nonetheless, the very possibility of 
such uses of it helps remind us of the amount of elipsis that 
Plato's formula involves, and the amount of expansion of it that 
we may require in order to understand its force. (For further 
discussion of Plato's use of ta hautou prattein# see also A.W.H. 
Adkins, "Polupragmosune and 'Minding One's Own iBusiness'," Classi­
cal Philology, 71 Cl9761, pp. 301 ,ff.)
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» contribution to the social system that he lives in - his hen ton peri ten 
polin.
To see how scrupulously Plato adheres to the Service principle, it will 
be useful to make a rapid review of his construction of the city. We have 
worked backward from the discovery passage at 433-434, following its backward 
references through 420B right to the beginning of Plato's exposition. We shall 
now move forward from that beginning to bring into relief the thoroughgoing 
functional rationale of Plato's city. By this means, the way may be prepared 
for a clearer grasp of Plato's theory of social justice, and for a clearer 
reading of the discovery passage.
Π
Though the bulk of Plato's lengthy exposition in II-IV is given over to 
the selection and education of the Guardians, we can best expose the underly­
ing structure of his theory by ignoring most of that and attempting to dis­
close the structural rationale of the polis as a practical solution to a human 
problem, locating in his account both the natural components that create the 
problem (see column A.l of Figure I on the next page) and those that contri­
bute to its solution (column B.l). Such an analysis shows Plato's view to be 
that the polis is a kind of human contrivance - the practical solution for a 
problem caused by certain features of our human nature and our natural 
environment. It is a solution made possible by certain facts about human 
nature, but, for all that, Plato's view falls far short - and very carefully
falls short - of saying simply that we are "by nature" political animals, or
2that our nature "necessitates" that we should be so. As we shall see, the 
various offices of his polis turn out to have both a "functional" and a 
"natural" ground, and neither one stands alone, though a certain priority 
attaches to the functional line of justification. Books II-IV of the Republic 
- despite their leisurely pace and wide-ranging subject matter, and despite
2. Plato's careful avoidance of "necessity"-talk is perhaps part 
of his sotto voce rebuttal to Glaucon's opening speech, and in 
particular to his view that life in a just society is chosen hos 
anankaion all' oukh hos agathon (358C3-4). At the same time, his 
strategy may also have been intended to avoid the sort of Sophis­
tic employment of necessity-talk that one finds in the Anonymus 
Iambiichi (cf. DK.II, 402.24-30, and A. T. Cole's discussion of 
this tract, HSCP, 65 (1961), pp. 127-163).
Figura I» (cf· section II of papar)
A. PROBLEM B. SOLUTION
1. Natural Basis 
•of Problem
2» Statement of 
Problem
1. Natural Basis 
of Solution
2. Statement of 
Solution
(I) As mortal and appear 
î titive animals, men 
have many different 
needs.
These needs must be 
satisfied in order 
for men to survive, 
let alone flourish·
a) Different men 
have different 
talents;
b) different jobs 
impose different 
schedules;
c) labor takes 
time and skill.
Men pool their talents 
and labor by reciprocal 
exchange of goods and 
services in a context 
of job specialization 
(adopted for the sake 
of efficiency, and 
excellence of quality).
(II) Once needs are sa- 
tisfied, men have 
wants (also based 
in their appetitive 
nature), and these 
wants have no natu­
ral limitations·
Pursuit of satis­
faction for these 
unlimited wants 
leads to conflicts 
and thus to war.
Men of spirit are 
available to spe­
cialize in the 
business of war 
(offensive and 
defensive)
Set up a Guardian Glass 
to function both (a) as 
an army (vs. external 
enemies) —  for which 
they must be fierce —  
and (b) as a Police 
force (against internal 
enemies) —  for which 
they must be gentle.
(III) Both fierceness and 
gentleness are nee­
ded in the Guardians 
(see II.B.2), yet 
these are opposed 
characteristics.
To harmonize or 
reconcile these 
opposed traits with­
in a stable character 
structure, very care­
ful education is. 
needed.
Men of special 
wisdom can super­
vise such educa­
tion and thus can 
save the city 
(412 A-B ).
Set up such men as 
a ruling element 
within the Guardian 
Class. (Later on, but 
not in Bks. II-IV, they 
will turn out to be the 
“Philosopher-Kings.")
n.b. This chart la so structured that reading each line from left to right 
is meant to force one on to the next line (as solutions to one problem 
generate another problem, and so on):
(A) (B)
(I) I.A ---- — —  >  I.B— ^ (■ Artisan Class)
* (II) * II.A — T T  « , . (* Auxiliary Guardians)
(III) ^ ^ I I I . A  — ----III.B («· Ruling Guardians)
δ
the seemingly arbitrary way in which they take up the education of the Guardi­
ans in such extensive detail - nonetheless pursue a highly systematic 
rationale for the polis and achieve a very tight-knit functional coherence in 
their account of the basic structure of offices or statuses in the polis. To 
defend this view, I will briefly review Plato's genesis of the city. These 
matters are extremely familiar, of course, but my hope is that the structural 
pattern to be exhibited here will make the exercise worthwhile.
(I.A) All humans have, by nature, a complex variety of needs for their 
survival, needs especially for food, shelter and clothing. Nature provides no 
automatic satisfactions for these needs (good caves are not so common,.cloth­
ing does not grow on trees), and work is needed to insure that they are met, 
(I.B) Since men have different sorts of aptitudes, physiques, and so on and 
since different jobs require different kinds of skills and of labor and impose 
different schedules of work, it seems much the most efficient way to satisfy 
these needs for men to band together, each specializing at the service he is 
best suited for and all participating in a mutual exchange of goods and ser­
vices. This is the most efficient solution (notice rhaon at 370A6 and C4), 
though alternative, perhaps less efficient, ways might also be devised.
(II.A) But satisfying primary needs and securing survival inevitably 
issues in a tendency toward luxury. Inevitably, because the appetitive part of 
the soul - that same part whose maintenance is basic to our natural needs for 
survival - knows no intrinsic limitedness; our pursuit of satisfaction for 
these appetites proves inseparable from a tendency to excess, and thus, since 
there is no limitless supply of such luxuries, nor of necessities, provided by 
nature, it leads inevitably to encroachment on our neighbors' supplies of 
goods: to grabbiness and pleonexia. This leads to conflicts with other commun­
ities and creates the problem of war with them. (II.B) Certain men, however, 
like certain breeds of dog, are naturally well adapted for fighting, and these 
men become the Guardians of the city. They are first introduced (373E,ff) for 
externally directed functions - their aggressive and defensive roles toward 
other communities - but because the same hankering after luxuries that leads 
the citizens into conflicts with external neighbors also inclines them toward 
conflict with each other, Plato gives his Guardians two functions: both their 
external business and the internal function of policing the state. (III.A)
This complex role, however, requires a highly problematic blending of con­
flicting attributes in the Guardians' character: they must be fierce toward
9enemies yet genuinely gentle to their fellow citizens, for they are to be a 
part of the city, after all, "fellow citizens" of all the others, and not like 
the savage watch dogs that some businesses turn loose to roam their grounds 
and keep intruders out while those who work there are away. They need careful 
training to develop a dependable blend of such opposing tendencies, and an 
educational program of such difficulty and importance cannot be left to run 
itself, but needs careful management. Fortunately (III.B), some of the Guardi­
ans are especially able to lead the others and to direct the educational sys­
tem which produces new Guardians. These few must be established as the Masters 
of the educational system and as rulers of the other Guardians (412A-E). Their 
good work is needed so that the other Guardians will do their work well, and 
the latter must function well in order to achieve the basic aim of having any 
polis at all, that of securing - of securely securing, we might say - the
3joint satisfaction of the basic needs of all the citizens.
The columns of the schema in Figure I summarize the present account, 
exhibiting both the tight-knit functional coherence of Plato's social system 
and the essential distinction between "functional" and "natural" grounds for 
the various offices encompassed in it. The pattern of this chart makes several 
key points clear. Plato's polis is, on this account, a system in which alj_ the 
offices are ultimately justified by showing how they work to secure the 
members' basic needs (I.A). That is to say, all the offices - the basic design 
of the entire system - are governed by our earlier Service Requirement. No 
appeal is made here to a "natural dominion" of Reason over Appetite, nor to 
any privilege based on "natural superiority." The distributive impact of 
differing natural aptitudes emerges only in our column B: that is, it is lim­
ited throughout to the assigning of men to the role by which they may best 
serve the interests of the whole. (Our Fittedness Requirement - item [Bl in 
Section I above - is governed throughout by item [C] there, the Service 
Requirement.) The functional line of justification is thus the operative one
3. Eventually, as the long argument of the Republic unfolds, it 
will turn out that these rulers of the Guardians are even more 
different from the other citizens than had earlier appeared: they
are philosophers, no less, men and women with all the metaphysical 
and psychological uniqueness that strange calling entails. Within 
Books II-IV, however, the functional and natural justification for 
their role is much more limited, and Plato's definition of politi­
cal justice is, after all, drawn from his founding of the city in 
Books II-IV.
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för offices - i.e., for the basic structure of the system - while natural 
aptitude serves rather to justify the choice of individuals to fill each 
office. As a consequence, notice, and despite the fact that Plato very often 
speaks of bestowing offices and honors in accordance with appropriate natural 
endowments (e.g., 415C1-2 or 453E2), it would be quite mistaken to say he 
holds that de facto differences in physis automatically, or of themselves, 
establish social privileges de jure. On such a view (a fairly common view of 
the Republie» I believe), the coexistence of the several classes of the city 
seems a kind of automatic growth of nature: some sort of "preestablished har­
mony" among a set of distinct class privileges somewhat on a par with the fact 
that oil tends to rise above, and float upon, water, nature thus bringing 
about a stratification which need not make any integrated, systematic sense, 
but simply exists kata physin. Interpretations which thus treat of Plato's 
city solely or primarily as a "natural growth" are, so to speak, one-sidedly 
focused on the right-hand, (B) column of our schema. Such approaches miss the 
functional significance - the problem-solving sense - behind the interrelated 
activities or functions of each sector, activities that serve to solve the 
essential survival-problem facing a city and thus work together for the common 
good of all its members. That is, they miss the relation of Column B to Column 
A. But throughout Plato's account, the functional line of justification enjoys 
a genuine priority: as the consecutive course of our "functional flow chart" 
shows, the securing of all the members' basic needs remains the fundamental 
principle of Plato's polis, from the start of its construction at 369B through 
to its conclusion at 427C.
But it is not just any; system that can serve all its members in a manner 
acceptable to them all. Plato's formula for justice, as we shall now see, cov­
ers precisely those features of the system - that set of fundamental or "foun­
dational" constraints on the very design of the system - that are to insure 
that the city will serve all of its members and will thereby be rationally 
acceptable to them all.
Ill
When the discovery passage tells us that the definition of justice has 
been before us "all along" (although not explicitly as a principle of "jus­
tice"), we should be guided, I believe, to look at what Plato has done with 
that principle in the course of his construction, in order to understand what 
he takes his principle to mean. When we review Republic II-IV in that way, we
ηfind, I shall argue, five distinguishable senses in which his elliptical for­
mula for justice as "each one doing his own" has been built into the basic 
fabric of the city. All five of these senses must be satisfied, he seems to be 
saying, in order for the virtue of justice genuinely to characterize the com­
pleted city.
Summarily stated, the five senses of the principle that Plato seems to 
envision are these:
(1) The Service Requirement on Individuals ("each one doing his 
job" involves "everyone doing some job," and no one free- 
loading or benefiting from the labor of others without recipro­
cating).
(2) The Service Requirement on Offices ("each one doing a job" 
requires that there be socially relevant, contributory jobs for 
each to do).
(3) The FitteHhess Requirement (each one doing his own job - the 
job he is best fitted for and best fulfilled by)/
(4) The Openness Requirement ("each one doing his job" involves 
each one getting to do his job: the system must be open enough 
for individuals to attain the positions they are fitted for).
(5) Uniqueness Requirement ("each one doing his job" involves each 
doing his own job and only his own job, not encroaching on any 
other). I
I shall briefly take up each of these senses in turn.
(1) The first aspect of the principle that "each one should do his job" 
is as a Service Requirement applied to individual citizens. Plato's stipula­
tion that each citizen do his own job no doubt focuses attention on each one's 
doing specifically that job for which he is best suited. More basically still, 
however, what this aspect of the principle requires is that each one should do 
something: that each must contribute, in some way or other, to the securing
of that common good for which the city basically exists. To capture this very 
general, fundamental sense of Plato's principle, we might best imagine his 
formula for justice converted into an inscription over the gates of his city, 
one addressed to all who enter into it. His formula, ta hautou prattein will 
then become to son pratte ("Do what is yours to do ," or the like). Even this 
inscription might, as we noted earlier be misinterpreted as apolitical or 
purely individualistic. ("Do your own thing.") But Plato's intention is of 
course quite the reverse. His motto-inscription would stand as an admonish­
ment, reminding all who enter that they must do so in the awareness that jus­
tice requires, as a condition of their receiving the benefits of the social 
system within, that each be prepared to reciprocate by contributing toward the
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common good. One can "enter" Plato's city only on the condition of reciprocity 
with its other members; indeed, accepting that condition is constitutive of 
each person's "entering" and becoming a member of, or citizen of, the city.
The Service Requirement as addressed to individuals is in essence the require­
ment that every member realize that he jte a "member" - a contributing part of 
an integrated, functioning whole: that he must "pull his own oar" or play his 
part and not attempt to "free load" or exploit the labors of other members. 
Perhaps to sum up this aspect of Plato's principle we might best translate our 
gateway inscription in a slightly different manner: what it means is, "Do your 
share."4
(2) Closely connected to this first sense of the principle is another 
form of the Service Requirement, this time applied to offices. The principle 
requires, in this second sense, that the political system can incorporate, and 
thus legitimate, all and only such offices as conduce to the basic goal of its 
very existence, the ongoing satisfaction of all its members' needs. (The 
satisfaction of this principle will be presupposed by all others; for only 
insofar as an office is itself politically justifiable can any individuals 
justly be required to perform in it or to respect the work of others who may 
do so. Any application of the Service Principle to individuals presupposes 
that there are legitimate positions in which the individuals can be expected 
to serve.) In this sense, the principle of "each one doing a job" proves
T. Here note particularly the language of sharing (koinon, 
koinonein, etc.) at 369E2-370A4 and 520A1 (set in contrast to the 
apolitical reading of ta hautou prattein that was mentioned in 
note 1 above). This principle of sharing might also be expressed 
as a principle of reciprocity among the members of the city and in 
this connection Plato's use of the words metadidonai and allelous 
takes on a special interest (see 369C6-7, 371B4-6, 372A1-2 and
especially 519E2-520A2). In this respect, at least, Plato's theory 
in the Republic shows affinities with the Pythagorean approach to 
justice as reciprocity within exchange relations that is discussed 
by Aristotle in E.N., V.5 (and cf. Re£. 371ET2-372A2). That 
chapter of Aristotle's Ethics has been well characterized as a 
kind of "commentary" on Republic 369-371 (cf. M.I. Finley, "Aris­
totle and Economic Analysis," Past and Present, 47 11970], pp. 1- 
25, quote at p. 14). Despite some affinities, however, Plato's ap­
proach does not stress (as Aristotle does in V.5) the mathematiza- 
tion of exchange values. That is to say, Plato does not 
"Pythagoreanize" in his approach to the theory of justice. The 
roots of his own theory lie, as I shall argue, in quite another 
area of Greek philosophy.
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equivalent to the principle of thoroughgoing functionality for the city. Plato 
conceives of the city precisely as a reciprocally interconnected set of 
offices that are all justifiable as_ contributions to the purpose for which the 
city exists (that of securing its citizens' needs), and the present sense of 
his principle says that a just city is one that does thus serve its citizens' 
needs - one which is made up of real jobs (efficacious social contributions, 
lives of socially meaningful labor) for the citizens to do.
(3) In its third sense, the principle of "each one doing his own" is our 
earlier Fittedness Requirement: that each should play the role within the 
polis for which his nature is suited. Taken in this sense, the principle 
serves not merely to state that the citizen should serve but to identify how 
he ought to serve. By virtue of this sense, Plato's principle has a certain 
"self-realization" aspect: each citizen is to do what he is best fitted for 
and will thus be playing the role through which his nature finds the greatest 
fulfillment and he, the greatest happiness, that he is capable of attaining 
(n.b. 421C4-6). However, such individualistic self-realization is of course 
not fundamental to Plato's theory. The citizens' activities are politically 
justified, not as self-realizations, but only as contributions to the welfare 
of the whole. Hence each one's self-realization can and must be limited on 
every hand: the profit motive of the artisans is checked by imposing limits on 
accumulations of private wealth; the Guardians' pugnacity and militarism, by a 
prudently managed foreign policy; and even the Rulers' urge toward abstracted 
contemplation must be checked (by "forcing" them back into the Cave). Each 
part can get?ionly so much self-fulfillment as proves consistent with a maximal 
comparable fulfillment for all other parts of the whole. But that much self- 
fulfillment, each citizen does have a right to expect from the system, and 
satisfying even this limited self-realization feature entails important con­
straints on the city: it must not deny self-realization to any member by 
"using" him against his nature or by denying him access to an available social 
role for which his nature suits him. At the same time, of course, this sense 
of the principle can be read as a competence requirement: that each one should 
have a role for which he is suited also means that only persons truly quali­
fied for a role should in fact get to play it. (Although the most obvious 
examples would be Plato's ruling offices, the same holds for all of them: no 
one physically enfeebled or susceptible to sun-stroke could justifiably be set 
to plowing open fields cf. 371C5-8;[371E].) We can thus read the present
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sense of the principle in two directions: it states what individual members 
can expect of their roles (that they offer to each such self-realization as he 
can fairly expect within and through the system), and it states what the role 
can expect of those assigned to play it (that they be competent for it by vir­
tue of talent, training, and the like).
(4) Both aspects of the previous "Fittedness Requirement" entail still 
another constraint on the system as a whole: that its offices must be open to 
anyone qualified to perform them. The requirement that the just city be one 
with "everyone doing his own job" must, by the same token, be construed as one 
in which everybody gets to do his own job - i.e., one where careers lie open 
to talents within the system and where reliable procedures operate to identify 
and develop Individual talents in a dependable way. (The clearest case of 
such openness in the Republic would no doubt be Plato's scheme for vertical 
mobility, both into and out of, his governing class f415B-C]. The career 
chances open to qualified women are still another example of the principle, 
though one not mentioned until well after the definition of justice has been 
arrived at.) This openness requirement is partly a functional imperative for 
the city - the essential means to its providing qualified workers to man all 
the necessary positions and so most efficiently to get the work of the city 
done - but it also means that the city must hold forth a fair chance for all 
its members to realize themselves as fully as they can within the system.
(5) In its fifth and last sense, Plato's principle of justice as "each 
one doing his own" is our earlier Uniqueness Requirement and stipulates that 
each citizen do one and only one job in the city - the one he is by nature 
suited for. For all its importance to the Republic, this sense of the princi­
ple stands in a curious relation to the others. It is very close in force to 
our earlier Fittedness Requirement but is not its equivalent. To generate (5) 
(the requirement that each one do only one job) from (3) (the requirement that 
each do a job he is suited for and thus can be fulfilled by doing), we must 
import the empirical assumption that each citizen has such narrowly deter­
minate natural endowments that he can function only in one way. That extrava­
gant, if not preposterous, assumption would scarcely seem to merit considera­
tion, and the real grounds for this sense of Plato's principle are not easy to 
discern. Although specialization of labor was first introduced (at 369-372) 
as a means of maximizing efficiency within the artisan class, later on (at 
434A-C) it is more or less shrugged off as a rule for the organization of
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labor there and retained only for the "vertical" class distinctions between 
artisans. Guardians, and Rulers (i.e., not within class I of our schema, but 
only between classes I, II, and III). That Plato should at least have enter­
tained abandoning it seems appropriate: since it was introduced only as an 
efficiency measure, it at least deserved consideration whether other measures 
might prove more efficient, measures such as having the citizens maximize 
their output by pursuing mastery in as many different areas as they success­
fully can. When he shrugs off the principle quite so casually as he does, how 
ever, it seems difficult to doubt that he does so for other reasons than the 
alleged ones. I am not concerned at present to identify those reasons - 
whether they spring from Plato's strong conviction that possessing private 
interests is necessarily Incompatible with attentiveness to public good, from 
an anticipation of his later metaphysical distinction between philosophers and
other types of men,5 from a desire to preclude democracy as a political sys-
fitern, or from all of the above. What I do wish to emphasize is that this last 
sense of his principle goes beyond the earlier ones in significant respects. 
Though it does in a sense grow out of them, it adds further assumptions and 
should not be permitted to block the others from our view. Thus for instance 
it would be quite wrong to suppose that only this sense of Plato's principle 
of justice underlies his argument against pleonexia. The Uniqueness Require­
ment may well appear to capture, and to appropriate to itself, the case 
against pleonexia, but it does so only in the very superficial sense that 
"doing one's own - when understood as doing only one's own and nothing else 
but that - must trivially, merely numerically, entail not encroaching on what 
is anybody else's "own." Plato tries to support.his definition of justice by 
emphasizing this implication of not encroaching upon ta allotria (others'
See Gregory ATI éstos1 treatment of this theme in the context of 
his analysis of Plato's view: "The Theory of Social Justice in the 
Polis in Plato's Republic," in Helen F. North (ed.). Interpreta­
tions of Plato, (Leiden, 1977), pp. 26-34 and passim.
W. ÄtHehian democracy, whatever else it was, at least involved 
each citizen's doubling, or even tripling his social roles, being 
active not only as a private person but in the military and in 
politics. Pericles' "Funeral Oration" puts great stress on both 
points about Athens: its "easygoing" attitude toward military du­
ties (Thucydides, 11.39) - in sharp contrast to Spartan, or Pla­
tonic, specialization and askesis - and then (II.40.2) its demand 
that every citizen should be concerned both with ta politika and 
with his private affairs.
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property or prerogatives) in his judicial example at 433E6-434A1, and by his 
remarks about polypragmosyne at 433B7, ff (note especially 433D1-3), but in 
fact the real ground barring pleonexia from his city is not the superficial 
one expressed in the Uniqueness Requirement (founded as that is on the arbi­
trary assumption that each person has some unique natural capacity) but the 
deeper and better one given by our earlier Service Requirement: the fact that 
the basis of the polis is the mutual pursuit of shared advantage and that this 
project requires the reciprocity of action we saw enjoined by our gateway 
inscription, a mutuality that would be disrupted by acts of pleonexia.^
IV
In the preceding sections we have tried to unpack the meaning of Plato's 
formula for justice by interpreting it through what he actually does with it - 
the various senses in which it guides his construction of the city "from the 
very beginning." Justice turns out, on this approach, to be that feature (or 
complex set of features) of the political system in virtue of which it can be 
expected to deal fairly with al 1 who participate as members in it and will 
thus be rationally acceptable to them all. Such an approach to the concept of 
justice is very much in the spirit of contractarian theorists who have
approached the analysis of justice in the context of imagined persons who, in
some "original position," are conceived of as contracting with one another to
Pinitiate a political system. But how, it may well be asked, can any such
approach apply to Plato's procedure in the Republic? He does not present his
T. The Tine of argument suggested here is essentially the Sophis­
tic one against pleonexia. Cf. the argument against it from the 
need for, and benefits of, eunomia in the Anonymus Iambiichi. Sec­
tions 6 and 7 (D.K. II.402-404). A.T. Cole has noted and explored 
the relations between Plato's procedure (here and elsewhere in the 
Republic) and that of the Anonymus (HSCP, 65 Π9611 , pp. 145-149).
8. I have in mind, of course, especially John Rawls' work. I 
should make it clear, however, that I have no wish to compare 
Plato's view with the detailed argument of Rawls' recent book.
Such comparisons with Rawls as I would make stay at the intuitive 
level of his original 1958 article, "Justice as Fairness." That 
article emphasized the idea that the institutions and practices of 
a social system should be acceptable to a]JI_ of its members, being 
understood by them as working to the advantage of every member in 
it, and I believe that this idea guides Plato's construction in 
the Republic.
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analysis of justice through any contractarian story but in Socrates' solo 
fabrication of a city in speech. And far from displaying any sympathies with 
the contractarian approach, Plato starts off Book II by having Glaucon set 
forth a contractarian theory hand in hand with his attempt to defend the life 
of injustice, and then has Socrates set about refuting that entire package. 
Contractarian theory would seem part and parcel of what Plato is opposing in 
the Republic, so it surely cannot be correct to suggest that his approach to 
justice has significant affinities with the contractarian approach.
And yet I believe that is exactly what happens in the Republic and that 
the explanation of this situation is not far to seek: what Plato is opposing 
in Glaucon and Adeimantus, so far as their theory of justice is concerned, is 
not their contractarianism but their conventionalism or positivism. On the 
account which they give in Republic II, societies are brought into existence 
(for somewhat peculiar specific reasons we need not go into now; see 358E3- 
359A2) and, once they have been established, the conventions they adopt and 
the legislation that they enact define what is to count for them as "the law­
ful and the just" (359A2-3). On this view, the content of a society's notion 
of justice presupposes the established existence of that society and is a con­
tingent derivative of its activities a£ a society. On Plato's analysis, how­
ever, justice is not defined merely by some established city's decisions, but 
is instead that feature (or set of features) of a social system that make it 
rational for its participants to join together in accepting coexistence within 
that system in the first place. The concept of justice is thus not a deriva­
tive, contingent result of some political association's activities but is 
rather a necessary condition for the rational constituting of that associa­
tion.9
Once this point has been grasped, it is plain that Glaucon does not 
really advance a contractarian analysis of justice at all. His peculiar 
employment of the contract myth proves little more than a rhetorical device 
for setting forth a conventionalist, or positivist, view of justice. His view 
resolves into a starkly polarized nomos-physis contrast, with justice emerging 
solely at the level of nomos, as the contingent result of men's associating 
with one another on the ground of what we might call the frustration of their
Note Plato's pointat Rep. I.351C-352A, and A. T. Cole's dis­
cussion of that passage's close relation to sophistic argumenta­
tion ("Anonymus," pp. 160-161, n.43).
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Physis (ï.e., their alleged natural preference for domination of others). On 
Plato's view, however, justice belongs to the very physis of a polis: it is 
the fundamental or constitutive attribute of the polis in the sense that only 
insofar as justice characterizes the polis can it be a workable system - one 
such that rational men may be willing and able to subscribe to it and thus to 
constitute themselves as a "city" in and through its framework. In short,
Glaucon actually uses the Social Contract device (or, rather, Plato has him 
use it) quite against the genius of that philosophical theory. He uses it as 
a simplistic, conventionalist "reduction" of the force of considerations of 
justice instead of using it as an "essentialist" defense of the absolute force 
of those considerations.
Taking the present suggestion to its limits, we might even approach 
Plato's Republic as a kind of contractarian theory in disguise. (An awfully 
good disguise, I would concede, since certain features of the contractarian 
approach prove incompatible with many aspects of Plato's political ideal, but f
I emphasize that my present suggestion is restricted to the thesis about 
Plato's analysis of the concept of justice.) Fantastic as this may at first 
appear, it is not very difficult to bring the hidden contractarian myth in 
Plato's own theory of justice into the open. Consider again Plato's opening 
remarks about the founding of a city. We are none of us self sufficient but 
stand in need of many things, and that neediness of ours is the basic princi­
ple for founding a city (369B5-7):
So, then, having these many needs, we gather many people into one 
place of abode as associates and helpers - each of us calling in all 
other members, this one for this service, that one for that - and to 
this dwelling together we apply the name of a "polis" (369C1-4).
But each of us "calls in" the help of all the others how? How else but by 
reciprocating assurances that each of them may "call on" our help in return 
for their help to us? What Plato sketches so briefly in 369C must surely be 
envisaged as a social contract entered into by a group of rational egoists of 
varying aptitudes and talents, each one pursuing his own self-interest through 
participation in the polis - i.e., acting, as Plato himself remarks, "because 
each supposes this Exchange] to be better for himself" (369C7). As Plato's 
construction of the city continues, justice emerges (as we have now seen) as 
that set of constraints on the system of offices and roles within which these 
men will live that is, in due course, understood to make the system a "rightly
Ί9
* founded" one (427E7), one rationally acceptable to each and all of them as the 
setting for, and the means for, the mutual satisfaction of their basic needs. 
Thus Plato's own account of justice - noncontractarian and even anticontrac­
tarian as it may appear - in point of fact establishes against Glaucon's so- 
called contractarian - but, in reality, merely conventional!Stic - thesis 
about justice, a theory of justice surprisingly similar in inspiration to that 
which later forms of contract theory have been used to justify!
To explore in depth what lies behind this strategy of Plato's would take 
us too far beyond the scope of the present paper. I myself believe, along with 
Cole and Guthrie and others, that the Sophists had developed the pragmatic 
contractarian approach to society that Plato relies upon here. A hostile 
reader of Plato might charge him with surreptitiously co-opting the insights 
of the Sophistic approach while trying to pervert it into the service of an 
archaic hierarchical and organicist social code. More sympathetically, I 
think, it could be said that Plato was convinced that when one tries to think 
through the sophistic program of pragmatic social design, one has to recognize 
the importance of considerations about the efficient division of labor and the 
impact of facts about differing individual capacities upon the social enter­
prise: i.e., one finds oneself driven, in the very course of following out the 
Sophistic approach, to constructing the sort of successive "functional flow 
chart" that we traced out in Section II above. Whether he was right to believe 
that the contractarian approach would lead one down that path - and if not, 
just why he was not - is too large an issue to embark on here, so close to the 
end of this mainly exegetical project. Again, whether or not one happens to be 
sympathetic with the hidden strategy of Plato's use of contractarian social 
theory, it might be noted that his larger purposes in the Republic rather 
forced him to deal with the concept of justice in the way he did: he had to 
" compress the extremely complex role(s) of justice into the enigmatic and mul­
tiply ambiguous formula "each one doing his own" in order to project that for­
mula forward for the sake of his subsequent analysis of psychic "justice" as 
the healthy internal organization of the composite human soul. It may have 
been for such reasons of large-scale, lively, and even suspenseful literary 
design, rather than out of any wish to conceal his surreptitious "borrowings" 
from Sophistic theory, that Plato so artfully postpones until the discovery 
passage his disclosure of the principle of justice that in fact has been in 
action from the very beginning of his construction of the polis.
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Plato believed that he had clearly differentiated the concept of justice 
from the concept of temperance (sophrosyne) through his long construction of 
the city in Republic II-IV. Many commentators have felt that, quite to the 
contrary, the two remain virtually indistinguishable on his account of them.^ 
Since our present approach has made so much of the discrepancy between the way 
that he "discovers" his definitions of justice and those of the other virtues, 
it may also enable us to see more clearly what he took the difference between 
the virtues of justice and temperance to be. The degree of success in dif­
ferentiating these two seems an important test of the adequacy of any reading 
of the Republic, and it may help to elucidate, as well as to defend, the 
present reading if we consider that distinction here.
Temperance comes to be visible in the completed city, whereas, justice 
stood before us from the very start. To grasp what Plato is conveying by that 
contrast, let us first transpose his distinction to a nonpolitical context. 
Consider a musical chorus - a standard four-part SATB group (Soprano, Alto, 
Tenor, Bass), along with their expert conductor. What "temperance" would mean 
for such a group would be the mutual adjustment of all five parts' performing 
activities to one another. All four of the singing sections will agree in fol­
lowing the conductor's lead and in seeking to blend their voices so as best to 
produce a unified choral effect. (None of the individual singers seek to 
"stand out" from the chorus, and no one section seeks to out-sing the others, 
or to "run away with the beat," setting its own tempos or dynamics, unmindful 
of the conductor's guidance.) And the conductor, for his part, conducts so as 
to bring out the best performance of the music from his chorus (not so as to 
focus audience attention on himself, or to "lord it" over the singers, or 
whatever). When all the participants in the chorus blend their performing 
skills in this way, they will be a "temperate" chorus, and their performances 
will manifest this temperance and be "temperate" ones, too. - More precisely,
10. for recent discussion, and many references to earlier ac­
counts, see C.J. Rowe, "Justice and Temperance in Republic IV," in 
Glen W. Bowersock et al. (edd.), Arktouros: Hellenic studies 
presented to Bernard M.W. Knox, (Berlin, New York, 1979), pp.
336-344. Rowe's own discussion, however, is restricted to indivi­
dual or psychic justice, a matter we have not addressed at all in 
the present paper. Even if we can succeed in defining a difference 
between justice and temperance in the polis, the problem remains 
of distinguishing between them in the individual.
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to be sure, the choral analogue of Platonic temperance would be all the 
members' genuine conviction that their several performances should blend 
together in the way described, that inner disposition of theirs to coordinate 
their performances to produce a unified choral result. But these inner convic­
tions are of course assumed to be efficacious ones: they are not mere hopes or 
good intentions that are forgotten under the pressure of actual performance. 
Therefore even though on Plato's account the chorus members' "virtue" of 
temperance lies not in their actions but in the inner, psychic structure of 
motivation and conviction that is manifested jin such actions, nonetheless this 
virtue is one manifested precisely in and through performance.
And what of justice in our analogy? It will consist in the fact that all 
participants in the chorus have the positions that they have for good and 
proper reasons. For instance, the persons singing in the soprano section will 
be those who are "by nature" sopranos (not, for instance, basses who are 
forced to sing in falsetto or castrati made to order for the role), and simi­
larly for the other sections: all will sing the parts their (vocal) nature 
suits them for. And the conductor, too, must have his position and his author­
ity within the chorus for the right reasons: not because he or his family have 
been heavy backers of the chorus, but for such genuine musical abilities as 
his knowledge and understanding of music, his ability to keep the beat and to 
communicate it clearly to the chorus, to conduct rehearsals and prepare per­
formances that bring out the best from his singers, and so forth. When posi­
tions within the chorus are so distributed that every member is "doing his 
own" - each one contributing to the shared goal of performing beautiful music 
in a beautiful way and doing so in the manner that he/she is truly best suited 
for - then the chorus will be a "just" one. Whether the performances of the 
chorus could be said to manifest that virtue of justice seems to me a prob­
lematic question, and one that perhaps illuminates the discrepancy between the 
discovery of justice and of the other virtues: The reason why justice is not 
"visible" in the completed city - or perceptible in our chorus performances - 
is not because it is not there at all to be perceived, but because it is 
"there" in a different manner. The other virtues are precisely "performance 
virtues," which manifest themselves in actions. But justice is a more abstract
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virtue, one that provides for the gathering together of the acting components 
into a unified whole but is not itself perceptible as a component of perfor­
mances. We might perhaps call it a "foundational" or "constitutional" as dis­
tinct from a "performance" virtue.
With the help of this analogy, we can perhaps make clear the difference, 
and the relation, between justice and temperance on Plato's theory. The virtue 
of justice is presupposed by that of temperance; it is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for it. The virtue of justice consists, for the city, as 
for our chorus, in the fact that every person in it is assigned the right role 
for the right reasons, and that is what makes it rational and proper for each 
person to be content with his role, dedicated to it in the stable conviction 
that he should be doing what he does and the others, doing what they do. The 
virtue of temperance consists merely in the members' having these convictions 
and adjusting their actions or performances to one another so as to produce a 
unified result. But justice is presupposed by it as the condition for their 
having these convictions and thus acting dependably in this way, not as a 
result of force or drugs or trickery but for good and proper reasons. Justice 
is that virtue of the system that makes it rational and proper for each member 
to accept his place within the system and to find fulfillment for himself (or 
herself) in and through that place. It is the virtue that enables temperance 
to "make sense" (as a reasonable virtue or way of life), and that is why it 
has to be on the scene before the virtue of temperance can emerge into view.
Our analogy with a musical chorus may help to explain a part of Plato's 
theory of the political virtues, but that is not to say that a chorus is a 
good analogy for a polis, or that Plato's theory of the political virtues is 
an adequate theory. One might say that just the reverse holds true - that the 
disanalogies between a chorus and a city help to suggest what goes wrong with 
Plato's theory. For instance, the members of a chorus may all be assumed to 
enter into it voluntarily, antecedently committed to the specific goal of mak­
ing music together and antecedently aware that their various individual musi­
cal talents must mesh effectively with those of others for the sake of achiev­
ing this end. Their natural musical endowments can fairly plausibly restrict 
them to one of the familiar parts or roles within the chorus; it is extremely 
difficult to sing both bass and soprano, and even more so to do both at the 
same time. What is more, in the case of a chorus it can easily be assumed that 
all the members who enter will antecedently, and quite nonproblematically, be
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aware what part within the chorus will be "theirs" to play: subtle distinc­
tions (or large voice-changes) apart, people tend to know whether or not they 
are basses, sopranos, or whatever. But a polis is lacking in all these 
features. People do not enter into it voluntarily, nor for any limited, 
antecedently agreed upon purposes, but exist within and through it as the locus 
for the maintenance and very definition of their lives. This often involves 
their choosing between competing goals or, perhaps, introducing new goals, and 
given such indeterminacy about the actual goals of the group, it remains 
unclear how any member could rationally accept his "natural endowments" as 
justifiably determining his assignment or restriction to some specific role or 
part within the city. Even more fundamentally, it is totally unclear how any­
one could realistically hope to discover what his determinate "natural endow­
ments" are supposed to bie. I think these disanalogies between a chorus and a 
polis could be developed (in less figurative language, of course^), and that 
Plato's theory of justice would prove vulnerable to a line of criticism based 
precisely on its violent departures from that very contractarian approach to 
justice from which, as I have argued in this paper, his theory took its rise. 
But that is a task for another occasion. My present concern has not been to 
question whether Plato's theory was a good one or not, but only to advance 
some suggestions as to what his theory was.
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ΤΠ The essential point is that the limited and antecedently 
agreed upon purposes and clearly defined roles within a chorus all 
make possible the nonproblematic satisfaction of the five com­
ponents of justice cited in Section III above - both senses of the 
Service Requirement, the Fittedness and Openness Requirements, and 
even (perhaps especially) the Uniqueness Requirement. But things 
are not nearly so clear in the complex, innovative and indeter­
minate actualities of living in a polls.
